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Can free will be saved from the threat of determinism? If one is willing to embrace a very 
modest notion of free will, certainly. However if one subscribes to a strong conception of 
free will, one that demands that a person could have been able to act otherwise than she 
did, then the picture looks much bleaker. For such a strong view requires that one’s 
actions be contingent while the determinist thesis argues that one’s actions are, in fact, 
necessary. In “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism,” Peter van Inwagen 
states the determinist thesis as follows: 
 
 (a)  For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses  
  the state of the world at that instant.  
 (b)  If A and B are any propositions that express the state of the  
  world at some instants, then the conjunction of A with the  
  laws of physics entails B. 1 
 
The problem such a view poses for a strong account of free will is that it appears to be 
correct. All non-living objects certainly obey physical laws and only transition from one 
state into another in accordance with those laws. A ball placed on a flat plane will not 
spontaneously begin to roll and swerve about. Rather, such behavior would only occur if 
the appropriate forces were applied to the ball in order to put it into motion. Further, 
there seems to be no reason to draw a distinction between what is living and what is non-
living as far as physical laws are concerned, for, while living organisms may certainly be 
more complex than non-living objects, they are both comprised of the same basic 
building blocks of matter. While the way in which the atoms in the brain respond to a 
stimulus or external force is far more complex than how a ball responds to a stimulus like 
a push, their behavior—and, thus, our behavior—would seem to be the necessary effect 
entailed by the initial stimulus in combination with physical laws.  
 However, while this deterministic understanding of reality is compelling, in this 
paper I will argue that, unless we are willing to reject premises even more plausible than 
the determinist thesis, the latter will culminate in a contradiction and should therefore be 
                                                
1 van Inwagen, Peter, 1975, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism”, Philosophical Studies, 25: 
185–99. p. 186 
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rejected. While showing that the thesis is false in this way will not serve as a positive 
proof that we have free will, it will undermine one of the primary reasons for thinking 
that we do not, thereby preserving the possibility that we have free will. 
 The contradiction inherent to the determinist thesis manifests itself in what I will 
call the Case of the Contrarian. In this case, scientists living in a world which we will 
assume is deterministic have managed to build an incredibly powerful Location And 
Physical Law Analyzing Computer Extraordinaire (LAPLACE) that is able to simulate 
physical laws such that, when the scientists enter the state of the world at a given time t, 
it is able to simulate how the atoms at t will interact and, thus, where and in what state 
they will be in at a later time t’. In this way, if the initial conditions of the Big Bang were 
entered into the computer, it would be able to accurately simulate the entirety of human 
history up through the present moment and indefinitely into the future.  
 The scientists responsible for creating LAPLACE are ecstatic. They have finally 
built a device that can see into the future with perfect accuracy by simply simulating the 
position and movement of atoms. Now, the only one thing left to do is to try out the 
machine. After entering the initial conditions of the Big Bang—the scientists had spent 
years to deducing them from current conditions—they put LAPLACE into motion. The 
computer begins churning away, the scientists pausing it occasionally to see if it is 
simulating historical events accurately—and indeed it is. Pleased with their work, the 
scientists take a leisurely lunch break and return to the lab to find that LAPLACE has 
simulated time all the way up through the present and into the future.2  
 One scientist, Susan, pauses the computer. Unable to contain her curiosity, she 
decides to search for where the cluster of atoms that make up her body will be in three 
hours. The computer quietly whirs for a few moments and then pulls up results indicating 
that, in three hours, her body is sitting at a coffee shop playing checkers with a man she 
does not recognize. Susan, however, is a contrarian and decides that she will do no such 
thing. Thus, after roughly two hours have elapsed, she drives the thirty minutes home, 
sits in her living room, and watches television for the rest of the day, thus invalidating 
LAPLACE’s prediction. 
 This case is very strange in that its premises, including the one stating that the 
world is deterministic, all seem reasonable and yet they clearly lead to a logical 
contradiction: LAPLACE is a computer that accurately predicts the future and yet it 
cannot accurately predict the future. Thus, one of the premises, while appearing to be 
valid, must be rejected as false in order to avoid this contradiction. To investigate which 
of the premises is the fallacious one, I will begin by laying out the premises of the case 
                                                
2 Of course, the scientists have no way of verifying that LAPLACE’s predictions for the future are correct, 
given that the events have yet to have been actualized. However, given that the universe is governed by 
physical laws and the computer can accurately simulate those laws (premise 3, below), it follows that the 
computer’s predictions will be accurate. Further, the scientists seem to have some justification for believing 
the predictions to be correct given LAPLACE’s remarkable ability to simulate the past with total accuracy. 
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and, through process of elimination, will reject the determinist thesis as being false. The 
basic premises of the Case of the Contrarian are as follows: 
 
1. It is possible for the computer to be physically constructed such that it is operable. 
2. It is possible to ascertain the initial conditions of the universe and enter them into 
the computer. 
3. Given initial conditions, future conditions can be accurately predicted using 
physical laws (i.e., determinism obtains) 
4. The computer has the capability to simulate these physical laws and, thus, predict 
future conditions. 
5. The computer can report the future conditions to the scientists such that they 
learn the full extent of the computer’s predictions. 
6. Given Premises 1-5, the future conditions are accurate such that if the computer 
says X will occur, then X occurs and if the computer says a person will Y, then she 
Ys. 
7. Susan is a contrarian such that, if she is told she will Y, then she does not Y (~Y). 
The contradiction arises from Premises 6 and 7. It is not possible for Susan, if told she 
will Y, to both Y, as Premise 6 entails, and ~Y, as Premise 7 entails. As Premise 6 follows 
from the first five premises, this contradiction means that one of the seven premises must 
be false. The question is, which one? 
 Let us begin by questioning the validity of Premise 7, as it appears to be the 
premise that generates the contradiction in the Case of the Contrarian. An easy way out 
of the logical inconsistency presented above would be to simply deny that Susan could 
have not gone and played checkers at the coffee shop. However, such a proposition—
that, when told one is going to Y, one necessarily Ys—seems to fly in the face of reality as 
we understand it. While perhaps there are some actions that, when predicted, one will do 
out of necessity (e.g., continue breathing, eating, etc.) LAPLACE should also be able to 
predict all the trivial things one does in life such a get coffee or play checkers. It seems 
inconceivable that a person, upon receiving a computer printout informing her that she 
will play checkers, has no choice but to play checkers.  
 Further, there seems to be nothing problematic about the stipulation that the 
scientist in question is a contrarian such that she will ~Y. Such a person would be 
analogous to a machine that, upon detecting Y, was programmed to ~Y.3 There certainly 
                                                
3 I am indebted to Peter Kung for this suggestion. 
 Determinism | Jesse Spafford | 10 
seems to be nothing problematic about such a machine, and the same seems to hold true 
for the contrarian.  
Also, to avoid charges of question-begging, I should point out that premise 7 does 
not presuppose any sort of free will or non-deterministic metaphysics. Even if our 
thoughts are determined by our environment, it does not seem unreasonable that there 
could be an individual whose actions are determined in such a way that, when told what 
she will do, will always do the opposite. Such a contrarian does not necessarily have a 
choice in the matter nor does she need to have had the ability to do otherwise (i.e., to act 
in the way in which she was told that she was going to act). Given this, there does not 
seem to be a good reason why a contrarian could not exist who, when told she will Y, will 
~Y. Thus, Premise 7 does appear to be valid despite the contradictions it raises. 
If one is willing to grant that Premise 7 holds, Premise 6 must be false as 
LAPLACE would predict that, “the computer tells Susan that she will Y and she Y’s,” 
but, in reality, Susan would be told she would Y and would ~Y. However, we cannot 
simply discard Premise 6 and declare ourselves finished, as it is the logical conclusion of 
the first five premises. Rather, one of these first five premises must be incorrect and thus 
lead to the contradiction between Premises 6 and 7. 
Let us begin by considering Premises 1, 4, and 5. I group these premises together 
because they all pertain to the basic feasibility of constructing and operating a computer 
capable of predicting determinist laws.4 Admittedly, it is certainly possible that such a 
computer could not be built. It might be too large, require more computing power than is 
possible, or run too slowly to ever catch up to the present and thus predict the future. 
While these are all legitimate possibilities, I will stipulate away such contingencies on the 
grounds that they are in fact nothing but contingencies: whether or not they are false 
seems to be merely coincidental to the contradiction between Premises 6 and 7, and, 
thus, we can legitimately assume them to be true and search for the source of the 
contradiction elsewhere. To see why I believe this to be the case, consider the following 
example:  
Einsteinian mechanics holds that it is impossible to accelerate an object that was 
initially at rest to the speed of light.5 The reason for this is because, as an object’s velocity 
increases, its mass appears to increase as well, although this effect only becomes 
noticeable when the object is moving very quickly. In fact, as an object approaches the 
                                                
4 It might be argued that Premise 5 is not a problem with the computer but, rather, a problem of being able 
to interpret the computer’s results since it would be calculating the position of swarms of atoms rather than 
the macro objects with which we are familiar. However, these macro objects (e.g. coffee, people, checkers, 
etc.) are merely specific arrangements of these atoms. Thus, LAPLACE would have to be programmed to 
recognize these patterns and report them to the scientists using their macro monikers. The feasibility of 
such programming seems to be a question of a similar kind to Premises 1 and 4 and thus I will address the 
three together.  
5 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "relativity," accessed May 04, 
2012, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/496904/relativity. 
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speed of light, its mass increases so rapidly that it approaches infinity. Thus objects at rest 
cannot be accelerated to the speed of light because the more massive an object becomes, 
the more energy is required to accelerate it (consider the amount of fuel needed to 
accelerate a truck as opposed to a motorcycle). Consequently, as an object approaches the 
speed of light and its mass approaches infinity, the amount of energy required to 
accelerate that object grows concomitantly such that, to achieve the speed of light, an 
infinite amount of energy would be required. As there is only a finite amount of energy in 
the universe, such a task is physically impossible. 
However, imagine that this feature of the universe was unknown to the scientific 
community and the debate over whether or not it was possible to reach the speed of light 
was still raging. To try to resolve the dispute, a team of engineers builds a magnetic train 
on a circular track and attempts to accelerate it to the speed of light. The engineers, of 
course, don’t even come close. However, the reason that they do not get the train to reach 
the speed of light is not because they lack the energy necessary to accelerate it to such a 
great velocity; they are unable to get the train up to a velocity close enough to the speed 
of light for there to be any noticeable increase it its mass. Rather, because of the materials 
available to the scientists, the engine powering the train overheats whenever the train 
runs for more than a few minutes, regardless of what material they use to build the engine 
or what type of coolant they use. The engineers conclude that if the engine of the 
magnetic train overheats, then any sort of engine will overheat, and all attempts to 
accelerate an object to the speed of light are abandoned. 
So what does this scenario tell us about the Case of the Contrarian? In the 
discussion regarding whether or not an object can be accelerated to the speed of light, 
there is the tacit premise that a physical mechanism exists that could do the accelerating 
without breaking down, a premise that, in the above scenario, turns out to be false. 
However, in this case there is no physical law that precludes such a mechanism from 
existing. That no such mechanism exists seems to be a contingent truth rather than a 
necessary one: there is a distinct physical explanation as to why objects cannot be 
accelerated to the speed of light, to which the problem of engines overheating is merely 
coincidental. This distinction can be described in terms of explanation: the reason that an 
object cannot be accelerated to the speed of light is because the mass of the object begins 
to approach infinity and thereby requires infinite energy to continue accelerating it. Thus, 
in the counterfactual world in which the mass of the object did not approach infinity, the 
object could be accelerated to the speed of light. This stands in contrast to the matter of 
the engine, for, even if the necessary materials for building an engine that did not 
overheat did exist, objects still could not be accelerated to the speed of light.  
Thus, what I suggest is, with respect to the Case of the Contrarian, while it might 
be true that Premises 1, 4, and 5 could be false as described above, the reasons why they 
might be false are contingent to the matter of determinism. Even if it turns out that there 
could never be enough computing power mustered to run a simulation with a degree of 
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complexity even close to that of the one described in the Case of the Contrarian, this 
would be merely a coincidental alignment of a physical truth with the metaphysical 
question at hand. For, if the two were necessarily related, that would mean that the 
reason that the world is deterministic is because of this lack of computing power or, 
conversely, that our computing power is limited because the universe is deterministic. 
Such a connection seems implausible: rather, I posit that any limitations to the scientists’ 
computing capabilities are the result of the materials available to them, the strength of 
electrical currents, etc., and not some necessary relationship between computing power 
and the laws of cause and effect.  
The point of this analysis is to show that it is theoretically legitimate to imagine a 
world where LAPLACE could be built that does not beg the question regarding the 
matter of determinism. If there were some necessary connection between computing 
power and determinism, then assuming the truth of Premises 1, 4, and 5 would entail the 
falsity of Premise 3. In such a case, the reductio I am trying to establish could easily be 
dismissed by the determinist as being as trivial as an argument that purports to disprove 
Einsteinian mechanics by assuming the falsity of Einsteinian mechanics as a premise. 
However, if I am right in thinking that it is not obvious that such a necessary connection 
exists, then we can presuppose the truth of Premises 1, 4, and 5 and still be surprised if 
Premise 3 turns out to be false, as one of the other premises might equally well have been 
responsible for the contradiction between Premises 6 and 7.  
Let us then turn our attention to Premise 2. The objection to this premise would 
go something as follows: there is no way to know the initial conditions of the universe, as 
humans simply don’t have the tools to predict these origins with any accuracy and likely 
never will. There are two responses to this objection. First, this limitation, too, does not 
seem causal to the contradiction raised between Premises 6 and 7. Second, while it may 
not be possible to know for certain the initial conditions of the universe, we can imagine a 
world in which the scientists building the computer could come close using available tools 
and accurately guess that which they cannot determine. Such a guess would be beyond 
lucky, but not impossible. Thus, for the Case of the Contrarian, we can dismiss 
objections to Premise 2 by stipulating that, in this one case, the scientists managed to 
make that incredibly lucky guess and therefore obtained the initial conditions of the 
universe. While people in this hypothetical world may doubt the accuracy of that guess, 
their skepticism would be irrelevant because Susan, the contrarian, will act counter to 
whatever the computer says she will do regardless of whether or not she believes the 
computer’s predictions to be correct. While Susan may not prove anything to those who 
believe the initial conditions were incorrect, we external observers know that, in this case, 
the initial inputs into LAPLACE were, in fact, correct, and, thus, her ability to act 
contrary to what the computer says is highly significant whether the people in that world 
recognize it or not. 
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So where does this leave us? If Premises 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 are all true (with Premise 
6 being the logical conclusion of Premises 1-5), then the conclusion that one must draw 
is that Premise 3—the premise that posits the determinist assumption that, given initial 
conditions, future conditions can be accurately predicted using physical laws—must be 
rejected in order to avoid the logical contradiction between Premises 6 and 7. Why 
determinism fails is unclear. It is certainly not justified to claim that this case is an 
example of free will as it is equally possible that randomness at the quantum level 
undermines the strict determinist understanding of cause and effect rather than human 
agency. However, given that the determinist thesis is one of the primary tools in the 
arsenal of those who would deny free will, the revelation that determinism is false due to 
an entailed contradiction would seem to shift the debate in favor of those who believe 
that we can do otherwise. 
Perhaps free will can be saved after all.  
	  
